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Photogjaphic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


23  WEST  MAIN  STREET 

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empreinte. 

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et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'imagas  nicessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mithode. 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

S 

6 

/(.p 


y 


SPEECH 


or 


MR.  CALIIOUI,  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA, 


OM  THE  nESOLUTlONB 


GIVING   NOTICE  TO   GREAT   BRITAIN 


OF  THE 


ABROGATION  OF  THE  CONVENTION  OF  JOINT  OCCUPANCY. 


Drlivrrrd  in  thk  Sk.natk  or  thk  United  States,  March  16,  1846. 


1 


Mr.  CALHOUN,  being  ontitled  to  the  floor,  rose  and  addressed  the  Senate ; 
The  question  under  consideration  is,  whether  notice  shall  be  given  to  Great 
Britain  that  the  convention  of  joint  occupancy  between  us  and  her  shall  ter- 
minate at  the  end  of  the  year.  To  that  question,  and  those  immediately  grow- 
ing out  of  it,  I  shall  confine  my  remarks.  I  shall  say  nothing  in  reference  to  the 
title  to  Oregon.  Having  been  connected  with  the  negotiation  in  its  early  stages, 
it  would  be  indelicate  on  my  part  to  discuss  the  .abject  of  title.  I  shall. abstain 
ft-om  all  personalities  and  every  thing  calculated  to  wound  the  feelings  of  others ; 
but  shall  express  myself  freely,  fuUy,  and  candidly  on  all  the  subjoctis  on  M'hich 
I  may  touch,  in  the  course  of  my  remarks.  With  these  prefetory  obsen-ations, 
I  ;  hidl  proceed  at  once  to  the  discussion  of  the  question  of  notice. 

There  is  one  point  in  which  all  must  be  agreed ;  that  a  great  change  has  taken 
place  since  the  commencement  of  this  session  in  reference  t  j  :!Oti>'.e,  in  its  bear- 
ings u|K)n  the  question  o^  peace  and  war.  At  that  time,  notice  was  a  ques. 
tion  of  the  first  inugnitudo,  on  Uie  decision  of  which,  to  allappeara.  cc,  depended 
the  question  of  ponce  or  war;  but  now  it  is  one  of  oomparativ"'ly  Minor  Import- 
ance,  and  may  be  decided  any  way,  witlio  .  any  decisive  eflect  on  either.  The 
cause  of  this*  cluin<je  will  i>e  explained  in  the  course  of  my  remarks.  So  great, 
indeed,  has  been  the  change  that  it  has  not  only  rendered  inapplicable  the  rea. 
sons  urged  in  the  Ine.J5sng(^,  re<H>mmending  notice  to  l>e  given,  but  has  altered 
materially  the  position  of  the  KxorutJve,  and  that  of  the  several  parties  iu  the 
Senate  to  whic^  it  has  {liveu  origin,  a3  I  shall  next  proceed  to  show. 

That  the  reconimciidatioa  of  the  message  is  founded  on  the  conviction  that 
there  was  no  hope  of  (•oin^)ro<uise  of  the  ditTicuitiejj  growing  out  of  the  Oregon 
question,  is  too  clear  to  a<irait  of  any  rational  doubt.     Its  liuii^^age  is  express.     It 
.states  in  so  many  worris  tli(>  conviction,  that  no  compromise  could  be  offectod  which 
ought  to  l)c  rtcrepted.     On  that  conviction  it  announces  that  the  offer  which  had 
been  made  to  the   British  minister  to  settle  the  controversy  on  the  4!)th  parallel 
of  liititudf  h;id  been  witliirawn  after  it^'  rejection,  and  our  title  to  the  whole  as- 
.serted.     On  thr  s;imc  CKiiviclion,  if  recommends. to  Congress  to  give  the  notice  in 
order  to  annul  the  convention  wiih  the  view  to  remove  all  impediments  to  the  as- 
sertion of  our  rif^lil  to  the   whole  of  the  territory.     Assuming,  then,  that  there 
would  lie  no  compromise,  it  informs  us  that,  at  the  Expiration  of  the  twelve  months, 
a  period  would  arrive  when  our  title  to  the  territory  must  bo  abandoned  or  Srmljf 


T«wcr  k^iriiiter  ,tJuUi  airMi  ,«ouih  of  i'cDDsjivania  Avenue. 


r.  ^  V  J 


maintained  ;  and  that  noitliorour  honor  nor  our  interest  M-onld  permit  us  to  abandon 
ii;  in  other  words,  that  wo  must  tiien  nnsert  our  exclusive  sovereignty  to  the 
whole,  to  the  exclusion  of  that  of  CJroiit  Britain,  unless  the  latter  should,  in  the 
interval,  abandon  its  claims  to  the  territory.  Throughout  the  whole  recommenda- 
tion there  is  not  the  sliglitost  intimation  that  any  compromise  is  expected.  On 
the  contrarj',  the  very  opposite  is  constantly  assumed, 

But  it  is  alleged  that  the  reasons  tor  believing  that  there  could  be  no  compro. 
raise  was  derived  from  the  evi.'i  uce  which  the  negotiation  itself  furnished,  and 
especially  by  the  n^jection  of  the  offer  to  compromise  on  4'J^.  Such  I  admit  to  bo 
the  case,  and  also  thiit  it  may  be  iiiirly  inli'rred,  if  England  should  renew  on  her 
part  the  proposition  rejected  hy  her  minister,  or  one  substantially  the  same,  our 
Executive  would  ac((>pt  the  otier,  and  settle  by com])roniise  the  conflicting  claimH 
to  the  territory.  Jbit  the  message  intimates  nowhere  tlu;  slightest  e\|)ectation 
that  such  an  otP'r  would  bo  made,  or,  if  made,  that  any  com|)romise  could  be 
etlccted. 

Such  is  the  view  which  I  have  lieen  constrained  to  take,  afler  a  most  careful 
and  candid  examination  of  the  portion  of  the  message  recommending  notice;  and 
such,  I  inti'r,  is  Ihc  view  taken  by  the  |)ortion  of  the  Senate  who  believe  our  title 
to  the  whole  territory  to  i)e  clear  and  unquestionable.  On  no  other  vitnv  can 
their  warm  and  decided  su|)port  of  notice  lie  explained.  They  not  only  believe 
thf>t  olir  title  is  clear  and  nn()uestionable  to  the  whole,  but  also  that  the  honor  of 
the  country  demands  that  it  should  be  asserted  and  maintained  by  an  apjieal  to 
arms  without  the  surrender  of  any  part.  Acting  on  this  conviction,  it  is  manifest 
that  they  can  only  support  notice  on  the  belief  that  it  would  not  lead  to  compro- 
misc.     On  the  opposite,  they  would  be  compelled  to  oppose  it. 

Such,  also,  would  seem  to  be  the  vit'w  taken  of  the  message  by  the  commu- 
nity at  large  at  the  time,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  tone  of  the  public  press,  or 
what  perhaps  is  a  still  truer  index — the  conduct  of  our  intelligent  business  men. 

The  message  had  a  most  decided  effect  in  that  respect.  Stock.,  of  every  de- 
scription fell,  marine  insurances  rose,  commercial  pursuits  were  suspended,  and 
our  vessels  remained  inactive  at  the  wharves. 

Such,  also,  was  the  view  taken  by  a  great  majority  of  that  portion  of  the  Senate 
who  were  opposed  to  giving  notice,  and  among  whom  I  include  myself.  We  op- 
posed  it  on  grounds  directly  the  reverse  of  those  on  which  those  who  believed  our 
rights  to  the  whole  territory  to  be  clear  and  unquestionable  supported  it. 

They  supported  notice  because  they  believed  there  neither  ought  to  be  or  would 
be  any  compromise.  We,  on  the. contrary,  opposed  it  because  we  believed  there 
might  be,  and  ought  to  be,  compromise.  Theyopposed  compromise  because,  as 
has  been  stated,  they  believed  our  title  to  be  perfect  to  the  whole  ;  while  we  sup- 
jKJrted  it  because  we  believed  the  title  of  neither  to  the  whole  to  be  clear  and  indis- 
putable ;  and  that  the  controversy  might  be  adjusted  by  a  fair  partition  of  the  terri- 
lory.  With  such  impression,  we  believed  that  two  such  powerful  and  enlightened 
countries  as  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  woukl  not  resort  to  arms  to  set- 
tie  a  controversy  which  might  be  peacefully  and  honorably  settled  by  negotiation 
and  compromise. 

Entertaining  this  opinion,  we  were  compelled  to  oppose  notice,  W-cause  it  was 
necessary  to  prevent  an  appeal  to  arms,  and  instire  the  pcacefiil  settlement  of  the 
question.  By  defeating  it,  a  breathing  time  wonH  at  least  be  afforded  to  both 
parties  for  calm  and  mature  reflection,  under  the  influence  of  which  it  was  hoped 
that  negotiation  might  bo  renewed,  and  the  cKflercnce  honorably  compromised. 
Or,  in  case  that  should  &il,  things  might  remain  as  they  have  been  without  a  re- 
sort to  force.  In  that  caso,  the  territory  woukl  be  left  open  to  emigration,  and 
the  question,  to  whom  it  should  ultimately  belong,  would  be  decided  b}  settle- 
ment and  colonization,  unless  Great  Britain  should  give  notice  on  her  part,  in 
order  to  prevent  it.  If  she  shouki,  we  would  at  least  gain  the  advantage  of  tran*- 
ferring  the  responsibility  &om  us  to  heri  ehotild  war  encue> 


An( 
notice 
deve 
elude 
the  m 


8 


lis  to  abandon 
Mgnty  to  the 
should,  in  the 
rccommenda. 
tpected.     On 

t'  nn  compro. 
irnishcd,  and 
I  admit  to  bo 
''iii'w  oil  her 
ho  saini",  our 
ictinff  rlaims 
'■  oxpecfation 
lise  could  be 

most  careful 
;  notico ;  and 
ievc  our  titlo 
er  vi(!w  can 
only  liclievo 
tho  honor  of 
an  appeal  to 
t  is  manifest 
i  to  compro. 

the  comma- 
ilic  press,  or 
siness  men. 
!)f  every  de- 
pended,  and 

rthe  Senate 
If.  We  op. 
believed  our 
ortod  it. 
be  or  would 
lieved  there 
because,  as 
lile  we  sup- 
tr  and  indis- 
^f  the  terri- 
enlightened 
irms  to  set- 
negotiation 

a»«e  it  was 
ment  of  the 
tied  to  both 
was  hoped 
nproinised. 
ithout  a  re- 
ration,  and 
I  by  settle, 
ler  part,  in 
{eoftran** 


Another  portion  of  the  Senat*  appeared  to  be  in  favor  both  of  compromise  and 
notice.  Their  views  wore  not  e.\|)licitly  expressed  ;  but,  as  for  as  they  were 
developed,  ibey,  too,  seemed  to  think  that  our  title  was  not  so  perfect  as  to  ex- 
clude ail  hoiioralile  compromise,  and  appeared  to  anticipate  it  in  opposition  to 
tho  iiiessiijre  in  recommending  it  on  the  three  following  grounds:  first,  on  the 
ground  of  the  gcnernl  declaration  ofthe  President  in  the  latter  part  of  the  message, 
that  he  hoped  an  amieab'.e  arrangement  may  be  made  ofthe  question  in  dispute, 
in  conni'xi(jn  with  a  declaiation  of  Mr.  Buchanan  to  the  same  effect,  in  one  of 
his  letters  to  Mr.  Pukeiiham.  It  is  impossible  for  me,  with  every  disposition  to 
siip|)orf  the  recomniendation  of  the  President  in  favor  of  notice,  to  concur  in  the 
opinion  that  a  merf  general  expression  of  the  kind,  and  inserted  in  another  por- 
tion ofthe  message,  even  when  backed  by  a  similar  declaration  ofthe  Secretary 
of  State,  could  he  liiirly  construed  to  overrule  the  opinion  clearly  and  explicitly 
expressed  by  the  mes-age  in  reeominending  notice,  that  no  compronriise  which 
ought  to  be  av(!e])fe(i  could  b(>  efiected.  I  cannot  admit  of  such  a  construction, 
not  only  because  I  think  it  unreasonable,  but  because  I  regard  the  duty  ofthe 
President,  imposed  by  the  Constitution,  to  recommend  measures  to  Congress,  as 
one  of  a  solemn  <haiacler,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  performed  with  the  utmost 
candor  and  sincerity.  IJeing  addressed  to  a  co-ordinate  department  ofthe  govern- 
ment, it  ought  to  express  i)lain!y  and  explicitly  his  reasons  and  motives  for  re- 
commending  the  measure,  omitting  none  which  he  regards  as  material,  and  in- 
serting none  Itut  such  as  he  l)elieves  ought  to  have  an  influence  upon  the  deliber- 
iitions  of  Congress.  It  ought  to  be  free  from  the  suspicion  of  being  diplomatic. 
To  admit  the  contrary,  would  destroy  all  conlidence  between  the  legislative  and 
executive.  de])artments  to  the  great  detriment  of  the  government.  With  these 
imi)ressions,  it  would  be  to  disparage  the  character  ofthe  President  for  me  to  concur 
in  tli(f  construction. 

The  next  ground  tiiken  by  a  portion  of  the  Senate  referred  to  is,  that  notice 
is  recommended  to  be  given  by  the  message,  not  with  the  view  of  giving  power 
to  the  President  to  assert  our  rights  to  the  whole  territory,  but  as  a  moral  weapon, 
to  f  nfltrce  com|)rf)mise. 

To  this  construction  I  have  the  same  difTicidty  in  assenting  as  to  the  preceding. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  language  ofthe  recommendation  to  authorize  it.  On  the 
contrary,  every  word  it  contains  looks  expressly,  as  has  been  stated,  to  the  en- 
forcement of  our  rights  to  the  territory  on  the  expiration  of  the  notice.  To 
give  a  contrary  interpretation  would  he  to  give  a  diplomatic  character  to  the  mes- 
sage, and  be  subject  to  all  the  objections  which  have  been  just  suggested. 
But  admitting  that  it  was  intended,  as  alleged,  as  a  moral  weapon  to  effect 
compromise,  I  would  ask,  how  could  that  be  effected,  but  by  using  it  as  the  means 
to  intimidate  Great  Britain — to  intimidate,  by  telling  her  that  she  must  quit  the 
territory  within  the  year,  or  bn  expelled  at  its  expiration  by  force  ?  And  what 
would  that  be  but  an  appeal  to  her  fear,  with  the  hope  of  extorting  concessions 
which  her  reason  had  refused  to  yield  ?  Such  an  appeal  in  case  of  a  feeble 
nation  would  Ims  hazanlous ;  but  in  that  of  one  as  great  and  powerful  as  England, 
instead  of  a  weapon  to  enforce  a  comprr»misc,  it  would  be  one  calculated  to  defeat  it. 

Tho  remaining  reason  for  voting  notice  on  the  part  ofthe  Senators  referred  to, 
is  of  a  very  different  character.  It  objects  to  the  convention  itself^  and  con- 
demns tho  policy  of  entering  into  either  that  of  1818  or  1827,  on  the  ground  that 
instead  of  being  the  means  of  securing  and  perpetuating  our  rights  in  the  terri- 
tory, they  have  had  the  Tcry  reverse  cfft'ct,  to  weaken  instead  of  strengthen  our  title 
to  the  territory.  My  opinion,  I  must  say,  is  precisely  the  opposite.  It  would,  in> 
deed,  have  been  desirable  to  have  settled  it  then  by  a  compromise  on  the  49th  paral- 
'  lei  of  latitude ;  but  that,  as  is  well  known,  was  impossible  at  the  time.  The  offer,  in 
&ct,  was  made  on  our  sid  e,  but  rejected  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain.  The  re- 
jection lefl  no  other  alternative  but  an  appeal  to  arms,  or  a  surrender  of  our  rights 
to  the  territory,  or  to  enter  into  the  convention.    To  do  nothing  would  have  beea 


.to  acquiesce  in  tho  claims  of  Great  Britnin,  wlu)sc  sulyects  wore  then  in  actua! 
pmsesaion.  Her  possession,  being  adverse  to  ours,  would  have  been  gradually 
oiaturing,  through  the  long  inter>pning  period,  into  a  title  too  perfect  to  bo  oppo- 
■ed  by  ours.  To  avoid  that,  we  were  compelled  to  resort  to  force,  or  enter  into 
a  convention  to  preserve  our  rights.  We  wisely  preferred  tho  latter,  and  the 
oonventions  of  1818  and  1H27  were  tho  consequence  of  that  preference.  They 
■were  entered  into  for  tho  two.fold  objects,  as  substitutes  for  war>  and  the  means 
.  of  preserving  our  rights  to  the  territory,  as  they  then  stood,  unimpaired.  To  appre- 
ciate  the  wisdom  of  the  policy,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  at  that  time  our 
means  of  asserting  our  rights  to  the  territory  or  of  acquiring  possession  were  ex- 
ceodingly  limited,  compared  to  those  of  (Jreat  Kritain,  but  that  they  were  steadily 
and  rapidly  increasing.  Those  who  had  the  management  of  affairs  at  that  period 
wisely  relied  uj)on  time  and  the  rapid  spread  of  population  in  a  weistern  direc> 
tion,  as  tho  means  ultimately  of  acquiring  possession  of  the  territory,  and  entered 
into  the  convention  with  a  view  of  preserving  our  rights  unimpaired  until  they 
could  operate  with  full  eflect. 

It  is  but  too  common  of  late  to  condemn  the  acts  of  our  pnMlecessors,  and  to 
pronounce  them  unjust,  unwise,  or  unpatriotic,  from  not  adverting  to  the  circum- 
stances under  which  they  acted.  Tlius  to  jtidge,  is  to  do  great  injustice  to  the 
wise  and  patriotic  men  who  preceded  us.  In  this  case,  it  is  to  condemn  such 
men  as  Monroe,  Rush,  Clay,  and  (iallatin — all  of  whom  had  an  agency  in  di- 
recting or  conducting  the  negotiations  which  terminated  in  the  adoption  of  these 
conventions.  It  would  be  hard  to  pronounce  men  like  them  to  have  been  un- 
wise or  unpatriotic  ut  what  they  did,  or  to  pronounce  President  Jackson  and 
others  aftci  him  so,  because  they  acquiesced  for  many  years  under  the  operation 
of  the  convention  of  1837,  when  they  could  have  terminated  it  at  any  time  by 
giving  a  year's  notice.  I  have  not  named  the  most  prominent  individual  con- 
cerned in  directing  these  negotiations,  because  his  course  on  thie  occasion  has,  in 
my  opinion^  cancelled  any  previous  credit  in  that  connexion  to  which  he  would 
have  been  otherwise  entitled. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  at  the  commencement  of  the  session,  when  the 
President  recommended  notice  to  be  given  totomiinato  the  joint  occupancy;  and 
such  the  position  and  grounds  assumed  by  the  several  portions  of  the  Senate  in 
reference  to  tho  notice.  Since  tl-en,  as  has  been  stated,  there  has  been  a  great 
change,  which  has  matorialJy  afleotfHi  the  question  of  notice,  and  tlie  position 
taken  by  the  difTerent  portions  of  the  body  in  reference  to  it,  as  I  shall  next  explain. 

Public  opinion  has  had  time  to  develop  itself,  not  only  on  this,  but  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Atlantic ;  and  that  opinion  has  pronounced  most  audibly  and  clearly 
in  favor  of  compromiao.  The  development  has  l)een  going  on  not  only  in  the 
community,  Imt  also  in  thin  htxly ;  and  J  now  feel  that  I  haKard  nothing  in  say- 
ing, that  a  large  majority  of  the  .Senate  is  in  favor  of  terminating  the  controversy 
by  negotiation,  and  an  honorable  compromise.  And  what  is  very  material,  the 
opinion  of  the  British  Government  on  the  subject  of'  compromise  has  been  more 
cleariy  and  specifically  developed  than  when  the  message  was  transmitted  to 
Congress  ;  so  much  so  that  there  ix  ground  to  hope  that  it  is  prepared  to  adjust 
the  difference  in  reference  to  the  territory  iHibstantially  on  the  basis  which  M'as 
offered  by  the  President.  It  seems  to  mo  iro|)ossiblt<  that  any  other  construction 
nan  be  given  to  what  Sir  R.  Peel  said  in  rrtply  to  the  question  put  to  him  by 
Lord  John  Kiuseil.  His  declaration  was  made  under  circumstances  calculated  to 
give  it  great  weight.  The  object  of  making  it  was  clearly  not  to  censure  the  able 
and  very  faithful  representative  of  Great  Britain  in  this  country,  but  to  use  the 
oc(!a«ion  to  give  assurance  that  he  is  ready  to  make  a  compromise,  as  it  may  be 
inferred,  substantially  on  tht*  basis  of  the  rejected  offer.  I  trust  sincerely  that 
such  is  tho  interj)retation  which  our  Government  has  put  upon  it;  and  that,  rs- 
garding  it  as  a  direct  step  towards  compromise,  it  has  met  it  with  a  step  on  our 


)  then  in  actual 
been  gradually 
tbct  to  1)0  oppo' 
0,  or  enter  into 
hitter,  and  the 
erejico.  They 
and  the  mcaDH 
ed.  To  appre- 
t  that  time  our 
^ssion  were  ex- 
y  were  steadily 
i  at  that  period 
western  direc- 
ry,  and  entered 
ired  until  thoy 

lessors,  and  to 

to  the  circum- 

injiistice  to  the 

condemn  such 

agency  in  di- 

iption  of  these 

have  been  un- 

Jackson  and 

the  operation 

t  any  time  by 

iidividual  con. 

rasion  has,  in 

liich  he  would 

on,  when  the 
;upancy;  and 
the  Senate  in 
been  a  great 
I  tlie  position 
next  explain. 
t  on  the  other 
y  and  clearly 
t  only  in  the 
»thing  in  say- 
e  controversy 
materiaJ,  the 
IS  been  more 
ransmittcd  to 
ired  to  adjust 
8  which  wais 
construction 
ut  to  him  by 
calculated  to 
sure  the  able 
tut  to  use  the 
as  it  may  be 
inccreiy  that 
md  that,  r«- 
stcp  on  our 


part,  by  suitable  instructions  to  our  minister  in  that  country.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  a  comuiunication  has  already  been  transmitted  to  that  effect,  which  may  hare 
the  effect  of  removing  what  would  seem  to  be  the  only  material  difficulty  in  the 
way  »fttn  adjustnietit ;  that  is  which  shall  makt;  the  first  step  towards  resuming 
the  negotiation. 

As  things  now  stand,  1  no  longer  consider  it  as  a  question,  whether  the  con- 
troversy shall  he  pacifieiilly  arranged  or  not,  nor  even  in  what  manner  it  shall 
be  arningod.  I  regard  the  airangenr.'ut  now  simply  a  question  of  time,  and  I  do 
frust  that,  in  concluding  it,  there  will  lie  no  unnecessary  delay.  The  business  of 
both  countries,  and  of  coinriierce  generally,  requires  that  it  should  be  concluded 
as  proni|)tly  as  possiible.  'j'here  is  still  another  and  a  higher  reason  why  it  should 
be  speedily  settled.  Tlio  question  is  one  of  a  momentous  and  delicate  character, 
and  like  all  such,  should  he  settled  in  order  to  avoid  adverse  contingencies  with 
the  least  |>raeticai)le  delay.  A  further  inducement  for  despatch  in  settling  the 
Oregon  question  is,  that  upon  it  depends  the  settlement  of  the  question  with 
Mexico.  Until  the  former  is  settled,  there  is  but  slender  prospect  that  the  latter 
can  he  ;  for  so  long  as  the  Oregon  question  is  left  open,  Mexico  will  calculate  the 
chances  of  a  rupture  between  us  and  (ireat  Britain,  in  the  event  of  which  she 
would  ho  prepared  to  make  common  cause  against  us.  But  when  an  end  :?  put 
to  any  such  hope,  she  will  sj)eedily  settle  her  diffl'rence  with  us.  I  trust  that 
when  we  come  to  settle  it,  we  will  deal  generously  with  her,  and  that  we  will 
()rove  ourselves  too  jii.st  and  magnanimous  to  take  advantage  of  her  feeble  con- 
dition. 

It  is  this  great  change  in  favor  of  the  prospect  of  settling  the  controversy  ia 
reference  to  Oregon  honorably,  by  negotiation  and  compromise,  which  has  occur- 
red since  the  comuienceiuent  of  the  session,  that  has  made  the  great  difierence 
in  the  importance  of  the  hearing  of  notice  on  the  question  of  peace  and  war. 
What  then  was  apparently  almost  hopeless,  may  be  now  regarded  as  highly  pro- 
bable, unless  there  should  be  some  great  mismanagement;  but  just  as  compro- 
mise is  more  hopeless,  notice  becomes  more  important  in  its  bearings  on  the  rela- 
tions of  peace  and  war;  and  on  the  other  hand,  just  as  the  chances  of  compro- 
mise are  increased,  notice  becomes  less  important ;  and  hence  its  importance  at 
the  commencement  of  the  session,  and  its  comparatively  little  importance  now. 

I  shall  next  proceed  to  inquire  what  bearing  the  increased  prospect  of  compro- 
mise has  on  the  position  of  the  Executive,  and  that  of  the  several  portions  of  this 
body,  in  refereiu'e  to  notice,  and  the  Oregon  question  generally.  That  it  is 
calculated  to  effect  materially  the  position  of  the  Executive  must  be  apparent. 
That  he  should  recommend  giving  notice  to  terminate  the  convention  of  joint  oc- 
cupancy of  the  territory,  with  a  view  of  asserting  our  exclusive  sovereignty  to  the 
whole,  according  to  h  view  of  our  title,  when  there  was  little  or  no  hope  of  com- 
promise, is  not  at  all  inconsistent  with  his  })eing  prepared  to  adjust  the  difference 
by  compromise,  substantially  on  the  grotmd  offered  by  himself|  now  when  there 
is  a  reasonable  prospect  it  may  be  effected.  Measures  of  policy  are  necessarily 
controlled  by  circumstances,  and  consequently  what  may  be  wise  and  expedient 
nrtder  certain  circumstances,  might  be  eminently  unwise  and  impolitic  under  dif- 
ferent circimistances.  To  persist  in  acting  in  the  same  way  under  circumstances 
essentially  different,  would  be  folly  and  obstinacy,  and  not  consistency.  True 
consistency,  that  of  the  prudent  and  the  wise,  is  to  act  in  conformity  with  circumstan- 
ces,  and  not  to  act  always  the  same  way  under  a  change  of  circumstances.  There 
is  a  prevalent  error  on  this  point.  Many  think  that  the  very  essence  of  consis. 
tency  is  to  act  always  the  same  way — adhering  to  the  same  party,  or  to  the  same 
measures  of  policy,  without  regard  to  change  of  circumstances.  Their  consis- 
tency is  like  that  of  a  physician,  who,  in  the  treatment  of  a  highly  inflammatoiy 
fever,  would  administer  emetics  and  calomel,  not  only  at  the  beginning,  but  at 
-every  subsequent  stage  of  the  disease.      It  is  the  consistency  of  a  quack. 


6 

which  would  bo  suro  to  kill  tho  |)ationt.  Tlio  |)iiltlic  iTwn  who  would  ho  coiisig. 
tent  in  the  sanio  way  would  ho  hut  a  political  (|na(k,  and  in  diiniirorous  (•n«i"'.,  hi;* 
prescription  would  he  not  less  fatal.  If  then  the  Ivveciitive  is  now  really  In  iiivor 
of  compromise,  notwithstanding  the  strong  lan<."in{ie  used  in  his  nicssuge  recom. 
Dicnding  notice,  of  which  I  have  no  inlorniiilion  that  is  not  coninion  to  all,  it  ought 
not  to  subject  him  to  the  charge  of  iiiconsislen(ry,  but  frliouhl  be.  put  down  to  the 
change  of  circumstances  to  which  1  have  adverted. 

That  it  is  also  calculated  to  allvr  the  |)ositioiis  taken  by  the  dillerent  porMons 
of  the  Senate,  in  reference  to  notice,  is  no  less  <-ertain  ;  and  that  my  friends  (for 
such  I  will  call  them)  who  go  for  the  whole  of  Oregon,  must,  I  am  sure,  leello 
be  the  case  with  them.  They  cannot,  I  am  con/idcnt,  liine  the  same  interest  in 
notice  now,  when  there  is  great  reasoii  to  believe  that  fhe  dilli'rence  vill  be  <'oni. 
promised  with  or  without  notic(>,  as  they  hnd  when  there  was  no  ho|)e  of  compro- 
miae.  It  is  clear,  that  under  such  change  of  circumst:ui(-es,  llie  reason  li)r  giving 
notice  with  them  has,  in  a  great  measure  if  not  altogelher,  ceased,  so  that  I  should 
not  be  surprised  to  find  their  votes  cast  iigainst  it. 

But  I  trust  that  the  change  has  gone  furtlier,  iind  that  they,  by  this  time,  begin  to 
aee  that  there  are  some  doubts  as  to  our  title  to  the  w  hole  of  Oregon  lieing  clear  am) 
unquestionable.  It  cannot,  at  least,  be  regarded  as  unqiiestionai)le,  alier  it  has  been 
questioned  s.o  frequently  and  with  such  ability  during  ibis  discussion.  Hut  if  their 
opinion  remains  unchanged  as  to  the  clearness  (jf  our  title,  1  jHit  it  to  them  whether 
there  is  not  some  delerencc  due  to  the  o|)inion  of  tli(\  great  niiijority  of  the  Senate 
who  entertain  different  views?  Is  there  not  something  due  to  the  tiict,  that  fhc 
majority  even  of  their  own  political  trituids,  whose  patriolism  and  intelligence  they 
cannot  regard  as  inferior  to  their  own,  think  thai  our  title  is  not  so  clear  but  that 
a  compromise  might  be  honorably  efli'cted  ?  'J'o  put  a  still  stnmger  <]uestion,  I 
ask  them,  as  patriots  and  friends  of  Oregon,  whether  the  fact  itself  of  so  great  a 
division,  even  among  ourselves,  does  not  alli)rd  strong  reason  why  th(>  controversy 
should  not  be  settled  by  an  appeal  to  fon;e?  Are  they  willing,  iis  wise  and  pa- 
triotic men,  desirous  of  securing  the  whole  of  Oregon,  to  place  the  country 
in  conflict  with  so  great  ji  power  as  England,  when  the  united  support  and  zeah 
ous  co-operation  of  all  would  be  indispensable  to  su])port  the  coinitry  in  the 
contest?  I  appeal  to  them,  in  the  humbler  character,  as  party  men,  whether 
they  are  justified  in  persisting  to  push  a  course  of  policy  which,  whether  it  should 
end  in  war  or  not,  must  terminate  in  the  division  and  distraction  of  their  party? 

Without  pursuing  this  branch  of  the  subject  further,  I  shall  conchide  what  I  had 
to  say  in  reference  to  it,  by  saying  that  I,  for  one,  G>vl  and  ackncnvledge  the  change, 
Nothing  could  have  induced  me  to  vote  for  notice,  in  ariy  form,  while  there  was 
apparently  no  hope  of  compromise  ;  but  now  that  there  is,  1  am  dispos(>d  to  do  so, 
if  it  should  be  properly  modified. 

I  am  thus  brought  to  the  (piestion  under  consideration,  to  which  all  the  preced- 
ing  remarks  were  but  preliminary — shall  notice  be  given  to  (Jrciit  ]?ritian  to  tenmi- 
nate  the  convention  of  joint  occupancy  ?  After  what  has  been  said,  a  few  words 
will  suffice  to  dispatch  it. 

The  question  is  not  free  from  doubt.  Afler  a  review  of  the  whole  ground,  I  can 
discover  but  two  reasons  in  favor  of  giving  it.  The  first  is,  to  put  an  end  to  tho 
agitation  of  the  Oregon  question,  which,  without  it,  may  run  into  the  next  presi- 
dential election,  and  thereby  become  mon;  diflicult  of  adjustment  than  ever.  Tho 
other  is  the  apprehension,  that  the  Government  of  (neat  Britain  may  wait  tho 
final  action  of  Congress  in  reference  to  notice  before  it  will  move  on  the  subject. 
Were  it  not  for  such  apprehension,  I  would  be  disposed  to  postpone  notice  for 
<he  present. 

The  next  question  is,  in  what  form  should  it  he  given,  if  given  at  all  ?  I,  for 
one,  can,  under  no  circumstances,  vote  for  absolute  notice,  although  I  admit  it 
would  be  less  dangerous  now  than  when  recommended  by  the  message.     I  can- 


f 


voiild  ho.  consig. 
(M'oiis  cnxcs,  his 

V  ifully  ;n  liivnr 
uicMsufic  rt|coiii. 
n  to  nil,  it  ought 
put  clow  n  to  the 

illtTpnt  por'ions 
niy  liicnds  (for 
am  sure,  li'»>|  to 
<ain<'  iiilciTst  in 
CO  V  ill  \n\  coni- 
io|)i^  of  cnnipro. 
■aHoii  tor  ffiviiip 
so  that  I  should 

s  time,  JM'friii  to 
l)ciii<;  clear  and 
ilh'r  it  has  lu'cn 
1.  I5iit  if  their 
)  them  \i  liethor 

V  of  the  Senate 
ic  tiut,  that  the 
tellip-nce  they 
)  clear  Init  that 
ifrcr  (|Mestion,  1 
f  of  so  jrreat  a 
he  controversy 
s  uise  and  pa- 
•c  the  country 
)port  and  zeal- 
oinitry  in  the 
men,  whether 
ether  it  should 
their  party  ? 

ide  \vhat  I  had 
tfe  the  change, 
ii!e  there  was 
losed  to  do  so, 


ill  tlie  preced- 
ritian  to  teimi. 
I,  a  few  words 

ground,  I  can 
an  end  to  the 
lie  next  presi- 

in  ever.  The 
may  wait  the 

n  the  subject. 

)ne  notice  for 

at  all  ?  I,  for 
Ligh  I  admit  it 
sage.     1  can- 


not  coHHcnt  to  give  a  vote  which  might  Ite  construed  to  imply,  that  there  was  no 
hope  of  compromise,  and  which  might,  if  given  in  that  form,  leave  a  doubt  in  the 
public  mind  as  to  the  real  opinion  of  the  Senate  in  n^fereiice  to  compromise. 

Nor  can  I  vote  tor  notice  in  the  tiirm  which  has  been  sent  to  uh  from  the  other 
House.  I  ol)jecf  to  it  as  ecpiivocal.  If  the  resolution  means  simply  to  declare 
that  the  President  maysi'ttle  the  controv<M'.sy  by  compromise,  it  means  nothing,  us 
the  President  has  that  right  under  the  ('onstitution,  and  can  neither  be  clothed 
or  divested  of  it  by  the  authority  of  ('ongress.  Hut  if  it  be  intended  as  a  hint  to 
him  to  settle  the  qu(<stion  by  negotiation  and  co[n|)roinise,  I  object  to  it  for  not 
plainly  saying  so.  I  am  utterly  opjHJsed  to  all  ecpiivocation,  or  obscure  expres- 
sions, in  our  public  acts.  We  are  bound  to  say  |)lainly  what  we  mean  to  say. 
If  we  mean  negotiation  and  eom|)romise,  let  us  say  it  distinctly  and  plainly,  in- 
stead  of  sending  to  the  President  a  resolution  on  which  he  may  put  whatever  in- 
terpretation he  |)leases. 

If  we  give  notice  at  all,  it  seems  to  me,  for  the  reasons  just  stated,  it  should  bo 
substantially  as  has  beitn  proposed  by  the  gentleman  from  Georgia,  (iMr.  Cot- 
Ui'iTT,)  which  plainly  ex|)resses  the  desire  oi'the  Senato  that  it  should  bo  settled 
by  negotiation  and  compromise.  For  it  I  am  inclined  to  vote,  as  at  present  ad- 
vised ;  but  reganling  notic(^  in  all  its  titrms  as  subonlinute  to  settling  the  con- 
troversy without  resort  to  arms,  I  r<-serve  my  decision  until  I  am  called  upon  to 
vote;  and  then  [  shall  decide  in  the  attirmative  or  negative,  according  as  I  shall 
judge  that  one  or  the  other  is  best  calculated  to  advanc(!  the  end  I  have  in  view. 

I  have  thus  stated  my  reasons  for  su])porting  a  compromise,  and  for  favoring,  at 
present,  the  giving  of  notice.  1  have  been  governed,  as  to  both,  by  tho  cir- 
cumstances under  wliieh  (  Hnd  myself  |)laced,  but  t!ir  which  I  am  no  ways  respon- 
sible. I  am  doing  tli<'  b(^st  I  can,  where  I  find  myseltj  and  not  what  I  would  un- 
der different  circumstances.  So  tiir  from  being  responsible  for  the  present  state 
of  things,  I  early  took  my  stand  against  that  line  of  policy  which  has  placiMi  us 
where  we  are.  I  refer  to  1S4:K  Then  the  Oregon  (juestion  for  the  first  time 
assumed  a  dangerous  aspect.  After  having  been  long  and  frequently  brought  to 
the  notice  of  Congress,  without  exciting  attention,  I  then  saw,  or  thought  I  saw, 
that  it  was  destine  at  no  distant  jjcriod,  to  lieoome  an  absorl)ing  and  dangerous 
question,  and  accordingly  felt  it  to  be  my  duty,  before  I  decided  on  my  course  in 
reference  to  it,  to  t'xamine  it  in  all  its  bearings  with  care  and  deliberation.  After 
much  reflection,  I  came  to  the  conclusi<m,  which  I  on  that  occasion  explained, 
in  a  speech  delivered  on  the  subject.  1  then  saw  that  there  were  two  distinct 
lines  of  policy,  which  might  be  pursued  :  one  was  to  adhere  to  the  convention  of 
1827;  oppose  (!very  attempt  to  annul  it,  and  strictly  observe  its  provisions.  I 
saw,  that  although  for  a  time  the  convtMition  had  operated  beneficially  for  Great 
Britain,  a  period  was  at  hand  when  our  torn  would  come  to  enjoy  its  benefits. 
Its  operation  had,  therefore,  thrown  into  her  hanils  the  whole  fur-trade  of  the 
region;  and  we  had  looked  on,  while  she  reaped  the  rich  harvest,  when  it  was 
in  our  power  at  any  time,  to  annul  the  convention  by  giving  the  year's  notice. 
But  I  saw  that  our  fJirbearaiice  would  be  compensated  by  the  advantages  which 
the  convention  was  about  to  confer  on  us,  if  we  should  have  the  wisdom  to  adopt 
the  proper  line  of  policy  to  secure  them.  The  increase  of  our  population,  and 
its  progress  westward  were  rapidly  extending  our  settlemeins  towards  the  Rocky 
mountains,  through  which  a  pass  had  been  discovered  ))ut  a  few  years  before, 
which  greatly  increased  the  facility  of  colonizing  the  te->':  — v- 

In  this  state  of  things,  it  was  #iear  to  my  mind  that  if  we  adhered  to  tho  con* 
vention,  and  respected  its  provisions,  the  progress  of  events  would  ulti- 
mately give  us  possession  of  the  whole  territory ;  as  our  power  to  settle  tho  ter- 
ritory, and  thereby  obtain  possession,  was  far  greater  than  that  of  Great  Britain. 
Its  distance  from  us  was  far  less,  and  the  approach  through  an  open,  grassy, 
country,  affording  great  facility  to  the  active  and  hardy  pioneers  of  the  West, 


8 

who  oinigratc  wi'h  thoir  fninilioN  nnd  hords,  with  little  PxpeiiNO  or  fatigue, 
Very  (iitlpiviit  wns  tiio  ciino  with  (Jrcat  Ilritiiin.  Tiio  distancr  to  Oregon,  by 
Water, t'roin  her  shores  eaiiiuit  lie  much  h'ss  than  twenty  thmisand  miles — a  (liHtHnce 
but  little  short  of  the  entire  eircumferenee  of  the  jjlobe  ;  while  her  ii|)|inmch  to 
jt  through  her  Am(>ri<un  possessiims  opjioses  great  <lini(  iilties  U>  rinigrntioii  on  a 
Jarge  seule.  Of  all  the  spots  on  the  glolie  uow  open  to  eolonization,  and 
PUHCt'irtilde  of  heing  eolonized,  it  is  the  most  remote  from  her,  and  the  most  difTi. 
cult  of  aeeess.  She  has  many  colonies  much  nearer  to  her,  to  which  there  is 
much  greater  liicility  of  access,  with  ecpial  soil  and  climate,  as  yvt  very  partially 
settled.  Kveii  New  /<  aland  in  all  these  respects  is  superior  to  it.  With  theHo 
mlvantages  in  oiu'  tiivor  in  settling  the  territory,  and  which  were  yearly  rapidly 
increasing,  it  was  clear  to'  my  mind  that  all  we  had  to  do  was  to  adhere  to  the 
convention;  to  ohserve  all  its  provisions  with  tht-  most  scrupulous  fidelity,  in  or- 
der to  obtain  the  actual  occupiUion  and  possession  of  the  whole  country. 

As  tin  ns  I  could  perceive,  there  was  hut  one  impediment  in  the  way,  and  that 
wa?,  that  (Ireat  Uritain,  in  order  to  |)rev  -nt  us  from  olitaiiung  possession  l»y  set. 
llement,  might  give  notice  heiseif  to  ti  oiinatc  the  convention  ti)r joint  occupancy. 
But  of  this  I  entertained  hut  little  apprehension.  I  had  read  the  correspondence 
of  former  neg((tiations  \\  ilh  attention,  and  my  inli  rence  was,  that  sh(^  jdaced  hut 
little  value  on  Oregon,  as  a  place  litr  a  permanent  settlement,  and  that  she  had, 
in  a  great  measure,  made  up  her  mind,  from  ilsgeogra|diieal  position,  that  it  would 
idtimately  pass  into  our  baiuls.  Uiit  he  this  as  it  may,  I  coulil  not  hut  see  that  there 
were  great  im|)edimentsiii  her  way  of  giving  such  notice,  as  wr)ul<l  precluileusfrom 
fhft  right  of  settling.  She  has,  indeed,  the  same  right  to  terminate  the  con- 
vention nf  lyo?  that  we  have,  as  it  is  expressly  provided  that  either  may  give  it. 
But  there  is  another  convention  which  sli»(  claims  to  he  still  in  existence,  and  to 
Xvhieh  we,  hrdding  under  Spain,  are  parties  with  her.  I  refer  to  the  iNootka 
Sovmd  convention.  It  is  strictly  analogous  with  that  of  lS'27,  though  dissimilar 
in  its  language.  But  unlike  th(^  latter,  it  contains  no  provision  t(>r  giving  notice, 
nnd  can  only  he  annnled  liy  violation.  I'nder  it,  we,  according  to  her  own  show- 
ing, have  e(]ual  rights  with  herself  to  joint  occupaticy  and  settlement,  of  which 
we  cannot  he  de|)rived  on  the  ground  on  which  she  places  her  rights  to  the  ter- 
ritory, without  a  breach  of  faith. 

It  seemed  then  to  me  clear,  that  our  true  policy  was  such  ns  I  have  stated ;  to 
adhere  to  the  convention,  and  let  settlement  del«Minine  to  whom  tlu^  territory 
should  belong,  affording  in  the  meantime  whatever  fiieilities  we  might  think  pro. 
per  to  our  people  emigrating  to  the  territory,  not  inconsistent  with  the  |)rovision8 
of  the  conve  tion,  and  extending  our  laws  over  tliem  in  like  manner,  and  to  the 
same  extent  that  (ireat  Itritain  had  by  act  of  Parliament.  To  me  it  seemed 
clear  that  xve  ought  not  to  go  beyond,  and  that  we  should  by  no  means  extend 
our  laws  over  it  territorially.  The  necessary  ellects  of  that  would  In;  to  extend 
our  tariff  acts  to  the  territory,  tmder  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution, 
"which  requires  that  all  duties  and  taxes  shall  be  laid  unifl)nnly  throughout  the 
United  States.  The  restrictions  im|)osed  by  our  high  tariff  duties,  on  the  infant 
commerce  of  the  territory,  would  go  far,  not  only  to  diminish  the  inducement  to 
emigration,  but  to  alienate  the  alHiction  of  its  people.  To  enjoy  the  blessings 
of  free  trade  over  the  broad  Pacific,  with  its  numerous  islands  ajid  widely-extend- 
ed coast,  will  prove  in  the  end  to  be  the  strongest  inducement  to  emigration ;  and 
lo  impose  high  duties,  would  do  more  to  check  emigration,  to  alienate  its  inhabit- 
ants,  and  separate  them  frr)m  our  Union,  than  anj  other  cause.  Oregon  will  be  to 
the  Pacific  what  New  England  was  to  tlie  Atlantic  in  its  colonial  state  ;  and  its  peo- 
ple will  contend  as  earnestly  for  the  unrestricted  enjoyment  of  the  trade  of  the  Pacific 
as  the  New  Englanders  did  for  that  of  the  Atlantic  betiire  the  revolution.  It  was, 
indeed,  one  of  the  princi])al  causes  which  led  to  the  revolution.  Sh""'d  we  re- 
strict by  our  high  i'ariff  duties  their  infant  trade,  they  might  rcadilv  ti  d  »  power 


i 


pr«| 

coil 

I 

«o| 
pa| 

til 

S'1 

toil 

<lo| 
foif 
thd 


I 


'UNO  or  fatigue. 
T  lo  Orpgon,  bjr 
ill's — 11  (listHiice 
lif-r  ii|>iir(mcli  to 
«'iiiif;r(iiioii  on  a 
Ionization,  and 
I  I  111'  most  (liffi. 
wiiitli  there  ig 
t  vci  V  |)urtiiilly 
'.  Willi  th«>Ho 
'  .vi'iiWy  rnpidly 
I  arlluTc  to  tlio 

/idi'iit},  in  or- 
iiiiifrv. 

\viiy«  11  nd  that 

M'ssion   ],y  HVU 

lint  (i<(ii|mncy. 
orr('.s|(()iKleiice 
she  idncpd  hut 
I  thai  s\w  had, 
II,  that  if  would 
sec  that  there 
reclndi' lis  from 
inalt'  (ho  con- 
r  may  jjive  it. 
stt'iici'.  and  to 
o  the  Nootka 
i<;li  dissimilar 
(iivin^r  notice, 
IT  own  show- 
K'nt,  of  which 
hts  to  the  ter. 

vc  stated ;  to 
the  territory 
;ht  think  pro. 
h(!  provisions 
r,  and  to  the 
ne  it  seemed 
mans  extend 
lie  to  extend 
Constitution, 
rouphont  the 
t>n  the  infant 
dncement  to 
he.  blessings 
idely-extend. 
^'ration ;  and 
its  inhabit, 
on  M'ill  be  to 
and  its  peo- 
)f  the  I'acific 
'"•     It  was, 
n.iifj  we  re- 
i-'l  A  power 


prepared  to  extend  to  them  all  the  advantages  of  free  trade,  to  be  followed  by 
consequences  not  ditficult  t«  bo  perceived.  Influenced  by  these  considerations, 
I  camo  to  the  conclusion  that  our  true  policy  was  to  let  our  people  emigrate  and 
govern  themselves  for  the  present  with  as  little  interference  us  possible  on  our 
part.  In  that  respect  they  possi^ss  great  ca|)acity  from  their  origin  and  their  na- 
tive instincts.  I  would  let  them  go  there  and  settle  the  country  in  their  own  way, 
giving  them  all  the  aid,  countenance,  and  support  which  we  could,  without  ex- 
tending our  authority  over  them  territorially,  until  it  could  be  properly  and  safely 
done.  Hut  be  it  dona  when  it  may,  great  judgment  and  caution  will  be  reipiired, 
for  there  lies  the  great  ditliculty  of  reconciling  the  interest  on  the  eusteru  side  of 
the  Rocky  mountain    with  that  of  the  western  side. 

The  other  line  of  policy  looked  to  the  termination  of  thi^  I'onvention  by  giving 
notice  and  taking  adverse  possession  of  the  territory.  The  liill  of  184!^,  already 
alluded  to,  was  intended  as  the  first  step.  I  oppos' ''  't,  not  only  because  I  be- 
lieved that  some  of  its  iirovisions  violated  the  convention,  'mt  because  I  believed 
that  the  course  it  indicated  was  highly  impolitic.  It  si'^  nied  to  me,  indeed,  to 
reipiire  little  reflection  to  perceive  that  if  the  bill  sh  iilil  pass,  and  the  policy  it 
indicated  be  adopted,  that  negotiation  or  war  would  nece'«-i:'rily  follov/ ;  and  that, 
if  the  former  should  be  resorted  to  in  the  first  instance  to  p'ovent  war,  it  would 
tcrmii'H'j  either  in  compromise  or  war.  There  could  be  i,o  other  result.  Nor 
was  It  more  ditlkult  to  perceive,  that  if  the  question  was  compromised,  it  must 
be  on  the  basis  of  the  4(ith  parallel.  The  past  history  of  the  aflUir,  the  fivct  that 
it  had  been  frequently  oflered  by  us  sul)stantially  as  an  ultimatum,  added  to  the  (Sict 
that  49"  was  the  boundary  on  the  side  of  this  Rocky  mountains,  left  no 
<loubt  on  my  mind  that,  if  settled  by  compromise,  it  must  be  on  that  basis. 
It  is  true  that  our  offer  heretofore  on  that  basis  had  been  rejected,  and  that  it 
might  thence  be  inferred  that  Great  Britain  could  not  accede  to  it  consistently 
with  her  honor.  I  am  not  of  that  impression,  'i'hings  have  greatly  changed 
since  our  ofl'ers  were  made  and  rejected  by  her.  I'hen  the  advantages  under  the 
convention  were  all  in  her  favor;  but  now  they  have  turned  in  fivvor  of  us.  Then 
our  capacity  to  settle  the  country  was  small ;  but  now,  for  reasons  already  stated, 
they  are  great;  and  what  is  far  from  being  immaterial,  this  increased  capacity 
lo  settle  and  colonize  stre.'gthens  the  foimdation  of  our  claims  to  the  territory. 
The  capacity  to  settle  and  colonize  a  contiguous  open  region  not  capable  of  Vic- 
ing settled  or  colonized  by  any  other  power,  goes  back  to  the  original  principles 
on  which  all  claim  to  territory  is  founded. 

Seeing  that  such  would  necessarily  be  the  consequence  of  the  line  of  polkv 
indicated  by  the  bill,  and  wishing  to  avoid  both  compromise  and  war,  I  took  a  de- 
cided  stand  against  it.  I  was  very  ably  seconded  in  my  opposition ;  so  much  so  that 
notwithstanding  the  apparently  large  majority  in  its  fiivor,  when  the  discussion 
commiuiced,  it  passed  this  body  by  an  ecpiivocal  majority  of  one.  I  say  equivocal, 
because  one  of  the  Senators  felt  himself  constrained  by  accidental  causes  to  vote 
for  the  measure,  after  he  had  avowed  his  opinion  against  it.  Since  then,  session 
after  session,  measures  have  been  introduced  to  give  notice  and  extend  our  au- 
thority over  the  territory,  with  a  view  ultimately  of  taking  possession  of  the 
whole.  As  anticipated,  negotiation,  in  order  to  avoid  war,  followed  ;  and  now  we 
are  brought  to  the  alternative  of  compromise  or  fighting,  as  ought  to  have  been 
foreseen  from  the  beginning.  I  again  repeat,  that  I  am  in  no  way  responsible  for 
the  present  atatc  of  things ;  and  if  I  am  compelled  in  consequence  to  vote  for 
compromise  and  notice,  the  responsibility  rests  on  my  friends  behind  me,  whose 
course  has  forced  the  Government  into  it  by  the  line  of  policy  they  have  pursued. 
I  do  not  impeach  their  patriotism;  but  I  cannot  but  think  that  they  permitted 
their  zeal  in  behalf  of  the  territory,  and  the  impatience  of  those  they  represent 
to  occupy  it,  to  get  the  control  of  their  bettor  judgment. 


10 


Hai-ing  been  thus  brought,  by  the  line  of  policy  to  which  I  was  opposed,  ti> 
choose  between  compromise  and  war,  I  without  hesitation  take  the  former.  In 
making  the  choice,  I  am  actuated  by  no  unmanly  fear  of  the  consequences  of 
war.  I  know  that  in  the  existing  state  of  the  world,  wars  are  necessary — that 
the  most  sacred  regard  for  justice  and  equity,  and  the  most  cautious  policy,  can- 
not always  prevent  them.  When  war  must  come,  I  may  appeal  to  my  past  his- 
tory to  prove  that  I  shall  not  be  found  among  those  who  may  falter;  but  I  shall 
take  care  never  to  contribute  by  my  acts  to  precipitate  the  country  into  a  war, 
when  it  can  be  fairly  avoided.  I  am,  on  principle,  opposed  to  war,  and  in  favor 
of  peace,  because  I  regard  peace  as  a  positive  good,  and  war  as  a  positive  evil. 
As  a  good,  I  shall  ever  cling  to  peace,  so  long  as  it  can  be  preserved  consistently 
with  the  safety  and  honor  of  the  country ;  and  as  opposed  to  war,  I  shall  ever 
resist  it,  so  long  as  it  may  be  resisted  consistently  with  the  same  considerations.  I 
am  emphatically  opposed  to  it  in  this  case,  because  |)eace,  in  my  opinion,  can  be 
preserved  consistently  with  both,  and  war  avoided  without  sacrificing  either.  I 
am  opposed  to  it  for  the  additional  reason,  because  it  would  be,  in  my  opinion, 
highly  impolitic — a  consideration  never  to  be  overlooked  when  a  question  of  the 
kind  is  under  consideration.  I  regard  it  a.^  highly  impolitic  in  this  case,  because- 
I  believe  that,  should  we  resort  to  it,  we  would  lose,  instead  of  securing,  the  lwo> 
objects  for  which  it  would  be  avowedly  declared,  as  I  sliall  now  proceed  to  show. 

The  first  is  to  secure  what  is  claimed  to  be  our  rights  to  the  whole  of  Oregon, 
under  the  cry  of  "  all  of  Orrgon  or  none."  Those  who  would  go  into  it  for  that  ob- 
ject will,  in  my  opinion,  find  in  tlie  end  that  '^nane"  is  much  more  probable  than 
**all."  In  coming  to  this  conclusion,  I  concede  to  my  countrymen  the  highest 
bravery,  energy,  patriotism,  and  intelligence,  which  can  be  claimed  tin'  them. 
But  these  cannot  overcome  the  great  obstacles  we  would  have  to  encounter,  com- 
pared  to  what  Great  Britain  would  have  in  a  contest  for  Oregon.  As  long  as  she 
has  a  large  fierce  in  the  East,  and  remains  mistress  of  the  Pacific,  she  will  bo 
able  to  place  there  a  much  more  cflicicnt  force,  and  at  far  less  expense,  than  w& 
possibly  can  at  present,  which  would  there  decide  the  contest  in  her  favor. 

But  were  it  otherwise,  from  the  nature  o*'  tlie  contest,  Oregon,  though 
the  cause  of  the  war,  would  be  speedily  iiirgotten.  Tlie  struggle  once  be- 
gun, would  soon  cease  to  be  for  Oregon.  Higher  and  far  more  powerful  mo- 
tives would  soon  guide  the  contest.  It  would  speedily  become  a  struggle  for 
mastery  between  the  greatest  power  inthe  world  on  one  side,  against  the  most 
growing  on  the  other.  Actuated  by  all  the  feelings  beIoii{>ing  to  such  a  struggle, 
both  sides  would  put  forth  all  their  vigor,  energy  and  resources,  and  overlooking 
minor  points,  woidd  aim  to  strike  the  most  vuliu^raljle,  and  where  each 
might  have  the  greatest  advantage,  leaving  Oregon  to  be  won  or  lost  as  the  con- 
tingencies of  so  mighty  a  contest  might  decide. 

The  next  object,  as  is  alleged,  is  to  protect  our  citizens  in  Oregon.  What  has 
just  been  said  is  enough  to  prove  how  utterly  it  must  fail.  Instead  of  protection, 
war  would  most  certainly  sacrifice  th"m  ;  and  that  is  a  strong  reason,  with  me,  for 
opposing  it.  I  feel  our  obligation  to  protect  them  as  citizens,  and  brethern,  and 
kindred.  We  have  encouraged  them  to  emigrate,  and  I  will  not  give  a  vote 
which  in  my  opinion  would  ruin  and  alandon  them.  But  what  war  would  fail  to 
effect,  would  be  certainly  accomplished  by  compromise  on  the  line  offered  by  the 
President.  There  are  none  of  our  citizens,  if  I  am  correctly  informed,  settled 
north  of  49°.  Establish  that  line,  and  we  at  once  give  our  citizens  in  Oregon 
peace  and  security,  and  with  them  full  opportunity  to  realize  their  object  in  emi- 
grating. 

But  passing  from  Oregon,  I  take  broader  ground,  and  oppose  war  for  rea- 
sons looking  to  the  whole.  I  .see  nothing  to  hope  from  war,  be  its  result  what 
it  may.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  that  the  most  successful  and  triumphant  war 
that  could  be  waged— one  in  which  all  would  be  accompUshcd  which  its  moai 


ext| 

C« 

Br 

trel 

its! 

fol{ 

alll 

br 

in  I 

bo  I 

Bi 

sH 

ina 

wq 


u 


8  opposed,  t» 
former.    Is 
equences  of 
essary — that 
policy,  can- 
my  past  his- 
l)iit  I  shall 
into  a  war, 
and  in  favor 
lositive  evil, 
consistently 
shall  ever 
orations.    I 
lion,  can  be 
f  cither.     I 
ny  opinion, 
stion  of  the 
se,  because- 
ig,  the  two' 
'<!  to  show, 
of  Oregon, 
for  that  ob- 
ibable  than 
lie  highest 
lor  them, 
inter,  com- 
ong  as  she 
lie  will  be 
%  than  w& 
vor. 

•n,  though 
once  be- 
vorfiil  mo. 
iviggle  for 
t  the  most 
struggle, 
erlooking 
ere  eacli 
the  con- 

^Vhat  has 
rotection, 
h  me,  for 
lern,  and 
o  a  vote 
lid  lail  to 
■d  by  the 
1,  settled 

Oregon 

in  emi- 

for  rea- 
lit  what 
ant  war 
its  moai 


extravagant  advocate  could  dare  hope  for — in  irhich  wo  should  conquer  the 
Canadas,  New  Brunswick,  and  Nova  Scotia — in  which  wo  should  drive  the 
British  flag  from  the  continent,  and  compel  Great  Britain  to  yield  the  whole  by 
treaty,  in  the  short  space  of  ten  years,  would  be  disastrous  to  us.  1  allude  not  tu 
its  ravages  or  devastations — to  the  oceans  of  bluod  that  must  flow,  and  the  mani- 
fold  losses  and  miseries  which  would  accompany  the  war.  They  arc  common  to 
all  wars ;  but  however  vividly  painted,  they  have  but  little  effect  in  deterring  a 
brave  people  from  a  resort  to  it.  No  doubt  these  'inflictions  would  be  very  great 
in  a  contest  between  two  nations  of  such  imm,'nsc  power,  and  so  situated  as  to 
bo  able  to  do  each  other  the  greatest  harm  in  war  and  the  greatest  good  in  peace. 
But  as  groat  as  the  devastation  and  destruction  of  life  would  be  in  such  a  strug- 
gle, they  are  of  a  nature  to  be  speedily  repaired  on  our  side.  The  indomitable 
industry  and  enterprise  of  our  people,  with  the  great  resources  of  the  country, 
would  soon  repair  the  former,  while  our  rapidly  increasing  population  would 
speedily  repair  the  latter.  War  has  far  heavier  calamities  for  a  ftee  people  than 
these,  though  loss  visible— calamities  in  their  nature  not  easily  remedied.  I 
refer  to  permanent  and  dangerous  social  and  political  changes,  which  often  follow 
in  its  train,  in  the  character  of  the  people  and  their  institutions.  A  war  between 
us  and  Great  Britain,  such  as  has  been  described,  in  which  every  nerve  and 
muscle  on  either  side  would  be  strained  to  the  utmost,  and  e\ery  dollar  put  in  re 
quisition  which  could  be  commanded,  could  not  fiiil,  under  present  circumstances, 
to  work  ir'^st  disastrous,  and,  I  fear,  incural)le  changes  in  the  social  condition  ot 
our  people,  and  in  their  political  institutions.  To  realize  the  consequences  in 
this  respect,  which  must  follow,  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  immense  extent  to 
which  it  would  rage.  It  would,  in  all  probaljility,  prove  a  Mexican  and  an  Indian 
war,  as  well  as  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  as  such  would  extend  to  every 
portion  of  our  jntire  frontier,  including  the  Athmtic  and  the  Pacific,  the  inland 
and  exterior,  constituting  a  circuit  uC  probably  not  less  than  7,000  miles.  It 
would  require,  in  order  to  conduct  it  with  tht!  energy  necessary  to  bring  it  in  so 
short  a  time  to  the  successful  termination  supposed,  especially  in  a  war  for 
mastery,  immense  exertions  on  land  and  water.  Two  navies — one  on  the  At- 
lantic and  the  other  on  the  lakes — and  six  or  seven  armies,  would  be  required  for 
the  purpose,  even  on  the  supposition  that  Oregon  would  be  abandoned.  One 
army  would  be  required  on  the  M(>xican  frontier ;  and  let  no  one  snc'er  at  the  men- 
tion of  such  a  power.  Feeble  as  it  now  is,  when  paid  and  supported  by  British  gold, 
and  trained  and  conmiaiided  by  British  oflicers,  Mexico  would  prove  a  f()rmidable 
enemy.  See  what  British  skill  and  training  have  made  the  feeble  Sepoys.  The 
Mexicans  are  a  braver  and  a  hardier  people,  and,  what  is  no  small  point,  would 
constitute  the  chea|)cst  of  all  armies.  There  •>'  -si  be  in  addition,  one  to  guard 
the  gulf  frontier;  another  to  guard  the  soui..erii;  another  the  northern  fron- 
tier on  the  Atlantic ;  another  to  assail  the  nortlufastern  frontier  on  the  side  of 
Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick;  and  another  to  assail  the  Canadian;  and  final- 
ly another  to  protect  our  widely  extended  Indian  frontier.  All  these,  in  so 
mighty  a  struggle  against  the  greatest  of  all  powers,  |)utting  forth  her  utmost 
stren^^tii,  woukl  require  a  force,  in(;luding  the  two  navies,  of  not  less,  I  would 
suppose,  than  200,000  men  continually  in  pay.  The  expense  would  be  enor- 
mous. One  of  the  most  venerable  and  experienced  of  our  citizens,  Mr.  Gallatin, 
has  estimated  it  at  65  or  70  millions  of  dollars  annually,  ifniy  memory  serves  me. 
My  impression  is  that  it  falls  far  short  of  the  actual  cost,  and  that  ^100,000,000 
would  not  be  an  over  estimate.  Supposing  the  sum  of  <S50,000,000  could  be  an- 
nually raised  by  taxation — a  sum  far  greater  than  he  estimates,  and  in  my  opin- 
ion much  beyond  what  could  be  effected — it  would  leave  $50,000,000  annually 
to  bo  raised  by  loans,  or  a  forced  paper  circulation.  Now,  allowing  the  war  to 
continue  for  ten  years,  there  would  be  incurred  a  debt  in  the  time  of  $500,000,000,. 
according  to  these  estimates.     Even  that,  it  is  probable,  would  fall  much  short 


12 


fvf  the  reality,  assuming  tlie  sum  stated  should  be  annually  required.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  obtain  loans  in  Europe ;  for  owing  to  the  conduct  of  some  of  the 
States  in  reference  to  repudiation,  and  other  causes  not  necessary  to  state,  the 
feeling  of  Europe  would,  I  fear,  be  generally  against  us,  while  our  own  resources 
would  not  be  sufficient  to  raise  the  sum  required  without  a  great  depreciation  of 
our  credit,  with  a  loss  of  20,  30,  or  even  40  per  cent.,  before  the  termination  of  the 
war,  in  contracting  loans,  or  in  couseqnence  of  the  depreciation  of  our  paper  cir- 
culation.  Includir,g  all,  our  public  debt  would,  at  the  end  of  the  struggle,  be 
probably  not  less  than  six  or  seven  hundred  millions  of  dollars.    But  this  is  not  all. 

We  would  be  plunged  into  the  paper  system  as  deeply  as  we  were  in  the  days  of 
the  revolution ;  and  would  terminate  the  war  with  a  mortgage  of  six  or  seven  hun- 
dred millions  of  dollars  on  the  luljor  of  our  people ; — for  on  labor  the  whole  must 
fall  ultimately,  while  a  large  portion  of  this  vast  amount  would  go  into  the  pockets  of 
those  who  ^ruck  not  a  blow,  nor  lost  a  drop  of  i)loo(l  in  the  contest,  and  who  ac- 
quired thoir  gains  by  seizing  \ipon  the  distress  of  the  government  to  drive  hard 
and  usurious  bargains.  In  addition,  wo  should  have  the  ditlicult  task  to  perform 
of  restoring  to  a  sound  state  a  greatly  depreciated  paper  circulation,  or  of  extricat- 
ing ourselves  from  it  whatever  way  we  might — a  task  which  cannot  be  performed 
without  great  distress  to  the  country  and  ruinous  eflTect  to  that  large  and  usually 
the  enterprising  portion  of  the  community,  the  debtors.  The  eflects  of  all  this 
would  be  highly  injurious  to  the  social  relations  of  the  people.  A  powerful  arti- 
ficial class  would  be  created  on  one  side,  and  a  poor  and  dependent  one  on  the 
other. 

Nor  would  its  effect  on  our  political  institutions  be  less  disastrous.  Such  a  war 
would  obliterate  the  line  of  distinction,  in  a  great  measure,  between  the  Federal 
and  the  State  governments,  by  conterring  on  the  fbrnifr  vastly  increased  power 
and  influence.  We  would  hear  no  more  of  State  rights.  The  federal  govern- 
ment would  then  become  a  great  national  consolidated  government..  Our  very 
success  ^'^ollkl  give  a  military  impidse  to  the  puijlic  mind  and  to  the  character  of 
"the  goveriuneut  which  it  would  be  hard,  if  |)ossib!e,  to  overcome,  and  which  would 
seek  conquest  after  conquest  until  a  spirit  would  be  engendered  totally  inconsis- 
tent with  the  genius  of  our  system  of  government.  It  would  then  be  in  the  straight 
and  downward  road,  which  leads  to  where  so  many  free  States  have  terminated 
their  career — a  military  despotism.  In  the  meantime,  we  would  have  to  provide 
for  three  or  four  successful  generals,  who  would  soon  l)e  competing  ti)r  the  presi- 
dency ;  and  before  the  generation  which  waged  the  war  would  have  passed 
away,  they  might  possibly  witness  a  contest  between  hostile  generals  fi)r  that 
supreme  office — a  contest  between  him  who  might  conquer  Mexico,  and  him  who 
might  conquer  Canada,  termin.ated  by  the  eword. 

I  appeal  to  the  gentlemen  who  are  the  warm  advocates  for  "all  of  Oregon  or 
none,"  regardless  of  this  miglity  hazard,  and  whose  separation  from  us  on  this 
<luestion  I  regret,  and  solenmly  put  the  question  to  them — is  ii  tor  you — ^jou, 
who  assume  to  be  democrats  par  excdleiicc — you  who  arc  the  enemies  of  the  paper 
system,  and  of  all  artificial  classes  in  society — is  it  for  you  to  support  a  course  of 
policy  which  might  lead  to  such  disastrous  consequences? 

But  I  oppose  war  not  simply  on  the  patriotic  ground  of  a  citizen  looking  to  the 
freedom  and  prosperity  of  his  own  country,  but  on  still  broader  grounds,  as  i^ 
friend  of  improvement,  civilization,  and  progress.  Viewed  in  reference  to  them, 
at  no  period  has  it  ever  Ijeen  so  desirable  to  preserve  the  general  peace  which 
now  blesses  the  world.  Never  in  its  history  has  a  period  occurred  so  remarli- 
able  as  that  which  has  elapsed  since,  the  termination  of  the  great  war  in  Europe, 
with  the  battle  of  Warterloo,  for  the  great  advances  made  in  all  these  particulars. 
Chemical  and  mechanical  discoveries  and  inventions  have  multiplied  beyond  all 
former  example,  adding  with  their  advance  to  the  comforts  of  life  in  a  degree  far 
greater  and  more  universal  than  all  that  was  over  known  before.     Civilization 


ha 

P' 
pe 

wo 

and 

tel 

to' 


1  '• 


13 


has  during  the  same  period  spread  its  influence  far  and  wide,  and  the  general 
progreus  in  knowledge,  and  itH  difTuaiftn  through  all  ranks  of  society,  has  outstrip- 
ped  ail  that  has  over  gone  before  it.  The  two  great  agents  of  the  physical 
world  have  become  subject  to  the  will  of  man,  and  made  subservient  to  his  wante 
and  enjoyments  ;  I  allude  to  steam  and  electricity,  under  whatever  name  the  lat- 
ter may  be  called.  The  former  has  overcome  distance  bo'h  on  land  and  water, 
to  an  extent  of  which  former  generations  had  not  the  least  conception  to  be  {ws- 
sible.  It  has  in  effect  rethiced  the  Atlantic  to  half  its  forncr  width,  while,  at  the 
same  time,  it  has  added  threefold  to  the  rapidity  of  intercourse  by  land.  Within  the 
same  period,  electricity,  the  greatest  and  most  diffused  of  all  known  physical  agentsi, 
has  been  made  the  instrument  for  the  transmission  of  thoughts,  I  will  not  say  with 
the  rapidity  of  lightning,  but  by  lightning  itseltl  Magic  wires  are  stretching  them- 
selves in  all  directions  over  the  earth,  and  when  their  mystic  meshes  shall. have 
been  united  and  perfected,  our  globe  itself  will  bocojno  endowed  with  sensitive- 
ness, so  that  whatever  touches  on  any  one  point,  will  be  instantly  felt  on  cver)° 
other.  All  these  improvements — all  this  increasing  civilization — all  the  progress 
now  making,  would  be  in  a  great  measure  arrested  by  a  war  between  us  and 
Great  Britain.  As  great  as  it  is,  it  is  but  the  commencement — the  dawn  of  a 
new  civilization,  more  refined,  more  elevated,  more  intellectual,  more  moral,  then 
the  present  and  all  preceding  it.  Shall  it  be  we  who  shall  incur  the  higf  re 
dponsibility  of  retarding  its  advance,  and  by  such  a  war  as  this  would  be  ? 

I  am,  in  this  connexion,  opposed  to  war  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  They  are  the  two  countries  the  furthest  in  advance  in  this  great  career 
of  improvement  and  amelioration  of  the  condition  of  our  race.  They  are,  besides, 
the  two  most  commercial,  and  are  diffusing,  by  their  widely  extended  commerce, 
their  blessings  over  the  whole  globe.  We  have  been  raised  up  by  Providence 
for  these  great  and  noble  purposes,  and  1  trust  we  shall  not  fail  to  fulfil  our  high- 
destiny.  I  am,  besides,  especially  op|iosed  to  war  with  England  at  this  time  ; 
because  I  hold  that  it  is  now  to  be  decided,  whether  we  are  to  exist  in  future  as 
fi-iends  or  enimies.  War^at  this  time,  and  for  this  cause,  would  decide  supremacy, 
we  shall  hereafter  stand  in  that  of  enemies.  It  would  give  birth  to  a  struggle 
in  which  one  or  the  other  would  have  to  succumb  before  it  terminated  ;  and  which 
in  the  end,  might  i)rove  ruinous  to  both.  On  the  contrary,  if  war  can  be  avoided* 
powerful  causes  are  now  in  operation,  calculated  to  cement  and  secure  a  lasting — 
I  hope  a  perpetual — peace  between  the  two  countries,  by  breaking  down  the 
barriers  which  impede  their  commerce,  and  thereby  uniting,them  more  closely 
by  a  vastly  e.ilargod  commercial  interoourse,  equally  benehcial  to  both.  If  we 
should  now  succeed  in  setting  the  example  of  free  trade  between  us,  it  would 
force  all  other  civilized  countries  to  follow  it  in  the  end.  The  consequence 
would  bo,  to  diffuse  a  prosperity  greater  and  more  universal  than  can  be  well 
conceived,  and  to  unite  by  bonds  of  mutiiitl  interest  the  people  of  all  countries. 
But  in  advocating  the  cause  of  free  trade,  I  am  actuated  not  less  by  the  political 
consequences  likely  to  flow  from  it,  than  the  Hdvnnt.tges  to  be  derived  from  it  iu 
an  economical  point  of  view.  1  regard  it  in  the  dispensation  of  Providence  as 
one  of  the  great  means  of  ushering  in  the  happy  period  foretold  by  inspired 
prophets  and  poets,  when  war  should  be  no  more. 

I  am  linally  opposeil  to  war,  because  peace — j)eace  is  pre-eminently  our  policy. 
There  niiiy  be  nations,  restricted  to  small  territories,  hemmed  in  on  all  sides, 
so  situated  that  \xar  may  be  nec<'ssary  to  their  greatness.  Such  is  not  our  case 
Providence  has  given  us  an  iidieritunee  stretching  across  the  entire  continent 
from  Kiist  to  W  est,  from  ocean  to  ocean,  and  I'roni  North  to  South,  covering  by 
far  tile  greater  and  better  part  of  its  temperate  zone.  It  compriees  a  region  not 
only  of  vast  extent,  Ijiit  abundant  in  all  resnurceH;  excellent  in  climate;  fi;rtil« 
and'  <  lerant  in  soil;  capable  ol"  sustaining  in  the  plentifvl  enjoyment  of  all  th» 
necesouries  of"  lite  a  popul-atioii  ol"  ten  tiinos  our  pri'siMU  number.     Our  great 


14 


^ni«flion,  as  a  people,  is  to  occupy  this  vast  domain;  to  replenish  it  with  an  inteUi- 
gent,  virtuous,  and  industrious  population ;  to  convert  the  forests  into  cultivated 
fields ;  to  drain  the  swamps  and  niorassos,  and  cover  them  with  rich  harvests ;  to 
buikl  up  cities,  towns,  and  villages  in  every  direction,  and  to  unite  the  whole  by 
ihe  nK)st  rapid  intercourse  between  all  the  parts.  War  would  but  impede  the  ,1il. 
Hlment  of  this  high  mission,  by  absorbing  the  means  and  diverting  the  energies 
which  would  be  devoted  to  the  purpose.  On  the  contrary,  secure  peace,  und 
time,  under  the  guidance  of  a  sagacious  and  cautious  policy,  "a  wise  and  masterly 
inactivity,"  will  speedily  accomplish  the  whole.  I  ventured  to  say  ''a  wise  and 
masterly  inactivity,"  in  desi)iteof  the  attempt  to  east  ridicule  upon  the  expression. 
Those  who  have  made  the  attempt  would  seem  to  confound  such  inactivity  with 
mtire  inaction.  Nothing  can  be  moie  unlike.  They  are  as  wide  apart  as  the 
poles.  The  one  is  the  oH'spring  of  indolence,  or  ignorance,  or  inditlerence.  The 
other  is  the  result  of  the  proioundest  sagacity  and  wisdom — a  sagacity  which 
lotiks  into  the  operations  of  the  great  causes  in  the  physical,  moral,  and 
political  world;  which,  by  their  incessant  operation,  are  ever  changing  the  con- 
dition of  nations  for  good  or  evil ;  and  wisdom,  which  knows  how  to  use  and  di- 
rect them  when  acting  favorably,  by  slight  touches,  to  facilitate  their  progress, 
and  by  removing  impediments  which  might  thwart  or  impede  their  course — and 
not  least,  to  wait  patiently  for  the  fniits  of  their  operation.  He  who  does  not 
under.stand  the  ditferenre  between  such  inactivity  and  mere  inaction — the  doing 
of  nothing — is  still  in  the  horn-book  of  politics,  without  a  glimpse  of  those  higher 
elements  of  statesmanship  by  which  a  country  is  elevated  to  greatness  and  pros- 
perity. Time  is  operating  in  our  favor  with  a  power  never  before  exerted  in 
i'avor  of  any  other  people.  It  is  our  great  friend ;  and  under  the  guidance  of  such 
a  policy,  it  will  accomplish  all  that  we  can  desire.  Our  popul.ition  is  now  in- 
creasing at  the  rate  of  about  600,000  annually,  and  is  progressing  with  increased 
rapidity  every  year.  It  will  average,  if  not  impeded,  nearly  a  million  during  the 
next  twenty-tive  years;  .at  the  end  of  which  period  our  population  ought  to  reach 
to  upwards  of  forty  millions.  With  this  vast  increase,  it  is  rolling  westwardly 
with  a  strong  and  deep  current,  and  will,  by  the  end  of  that  period,  have  spread 
from  ocean  to  ocean.  Its  course  is  irresistible.  The  coast  of  the  Pacific  will 
then  be  probably  as  densely  populated,  and  as  thickly  studded  with  towns  and 
villages,  in  proportion  to  its  capacity  to  sustain  population,  as  that  of  the  Atlantic 
now  is.  At  the  same  rate,  we  shall  have  increased  to  upwards  of  eighty  mil- 
lions of  people  at  t]ie  end  of  another  twenty-five  years;  when,  with  one  foot  on 
the  Atlantic  and  the  other  on  the  Pacific,  and  occupying  a  position  between  the 
eastern  and  western  roasts  of  the  old  continent,  we  shall  be  in  a  position  better 
calculated  to  control  thr  commerce  of  both  oceans,  and  to  exert  an  influence  over 
both  continents,  than  any  other  country  in  the  world.  If  we  avoid  war,  and  ad- 
here  to  peace,  all  this  will  be  efi'ected — efli'cted,  I  trust,  without  the  loss  of  our 
free  popular  institutions.  I  am  aware  how  difllcult  is  the  task  to  preserve  free 
institutions  over  so  wide  a  space,  and  so  immense  a  population ;  but  we  are 
blessed  with  a  Constitution  admirably  calculated  to  accomplish  it.  Its  elastic 
power  is  unequalled,  which  is  to  be  attributed  to  its  federal  character.  The  hope 
of"  success  depends  on  preserving  that  feature  iu  its  full  perfection,  and  adhering 
to  peace  as  our  policy.  War  may  make  us  great ;  but  let  it  never  be  forgotten 
that  peace  only  can  make  ue  both  great  and  free. 

With  a  few  remarks  relating  to  myself  personally,  I  shall  conclude.  I  have 
been  charged  with  being  more  strongly  inclined  to  secure  the  annexation  of  Texas, 
than  our  righta  to  Oregon.  It  has  been  attributed  to  my  greater  partiality  to  the 
South  than  to  the  West.  Hut  I  am  yet  to  learn  why  Texas  should  be  considered 
as  belonging  to  the  South  rathem  than  to  the  West.  I  always  thought  that  it 
formed  a  part,  and  not  an  unimportant  part,  of  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi;  and 
«n  that  account,  as  well  as  tor  giving  greater  security  to  the  southern  portion  of 


*he  V 
Texa 
north 
the 
had 


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the  valloj,  tho  West  dosirod  its  annexation.  Bosidea,  I  have  yet  to  learn  that 
Texas  is  conflned  to  a  southern  latitude.  I  had  supposed  that  it  extended  far 
north  and  west,  up  to  the  latitude  of  42^  in  tiie  neighborhood  of  the  great  pass  of 
the  Rocky  mountains,  on  which  the  value  of  Oregon  to  us  so  much  depends.  I 
had  supposed  that  what  are  called  the  Southern  States  had  not  so  direct  and  deep 
an  interest  in  its  annexation  as  the  West;  but  it  would  seem,  from  language  held 
on  the  occasion,  that  in  all  this  1  was  mistaken,  and  that  the  annexation  of  Texas 
was  purely  a  Southern  question,  and  only  supported  by  the  West  under  the  ex- 
pectation of  obtaining  in  retiuii  the  support  of  tho  South  to  the  whole  of  Oregon 
up  to  54*  40',  and,  if  necessary,  at  the  certain  hazard  of  a  war. 

But  |)assing  by  all  this,  and  assuming  that  Texas  was  purely  a  Southern,  and 
Oregon  a  Western  question,  I  repel  the  charge  of  partiality,  and  shall  now  pro- 
ceed to  show,  that  if  a  diHorcnt  line  of  policy  was  piu'sued  i)y  me  in  reference  to 
tho  two,  it  was  because  it  was  right  and  proper  it  should  i)0.  I  treated  both 
questions  iri  the  manner  best  calcidated  to  etlt^ct  the  object  in  view,  and  indeed 
the  only  one  by  which  both  could  l)e  secured.  The  circumstances  of  the  two 
cases  were  entirely  ditfercnt.  In  the  case  of  Texas,  time  was  against  us,  in 
that  of  Oregon,  time  was  with  us  ;  and  hence  the  ditlerence  in  my  course  of  policy 
in  reference  to  them.  To  understand  the  diflerence  it  is  necessary  to  premise, 
that  Texas  had  readied  that  period  in  her  history  when  it  was  clear  that  she 
would  be  compelled  to  form  intimate  and  dependent  relations  either  with  us  or 
England,  if  she  continued  independent.  But  it  was  manifest,  if  left  alone,  with- 
out any  movement  on  our  part,  that  her  connexion  must  be  with  England  and 
not  with  us.  She  could  extend  to  Texas  commercial  advantages  liir  greater  than 
we  possibly  could,  and  aflbrd  her  greater  facilities  in  obtaining  means  to  relieve 
her  from  her  great  pecuniary  embarrassments.  England  saw  this,  and  had  ac- 
tually commenced  h(  r  movements  to  avail  hersell'of  its  advantages.  We,  too, 
poTceived  it;  and  also  that  annexation  aflbrded  the  only  means  of  counteracting 
her  movements,  and  preventing  Texas  from  being  plac(!d  exclusively  under  her 
control.  In  this  emergency,  I  was  called  to  the  State  Department,  with  a  view 
of  taking  charge  of  the  jiending  negotiation  for  annexation.  I  saw  that  the  time 
had  arrived  when  immediate  and  decided  action  was  ri^quircd ;  that  time  was 
against  us,  and  that  to  resist  the  eftects  of  its  operation  boldness  and  decision  were  in- 
dispensable. I  acted  accordingly,  and  success  proved  the  soundness  of  my  policy. 
It  v»'as  not  a  case  for  masterly  inactivity.  Not  so  the  case  of  Oregon,  where 
time  was  with  us,  and  iience  the  diflerent  line  of  policy  which  I  adopted  in  rc- 
-^rence  to  it,  and  which  would  have  secured  the  whole,  had  my  advice  been  fol- 
lowed, as  has  been  explained. 

In  ore  particular  my  |)olicy  was  the  same  in  both  cases.  I  aimed  in  each  to  ■ 
avoid  war  and  preserve  peace.  I  clearly  perceived  that  in  annexing  Texas  there 
was  no  danger  of  a  war  with  England,  if  managed  judiciously.  She  was  an  in- 
depent  state,  and  had  been  so  acknowledged  by  England,  France,  and  other  pow- 
ers.  She  had  a  right,  as  such,  to  dispose  of  herself,  and  to  unite  her  destinies 
with  ours,  if  she  saw  proper,  without  any  right  on  the  part  of  England  to  resist  it, 
or  ground  or  pretext  to  make  war  in  consequence.  I  also  perceived  that  there  were 
no  just  grounds  to  apprehend  a  Mexican  war  in  consequence.  She  was  not  in  a 
condition  to  make  war,  without  the  aid  of  England,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  ap- 
prehend that  she  would  be  aided  or  countenanced  in  it  by  the  latter;  unless, indeed, 
the  Oregon  question  shoul4,tenninate  in  a  war  l)ctween  us  and  her,  in  which  event, 
I  regarded  a  Mexican  war  as  inevitable,  as  has  been  stated.  Thus  far  my  antici. 
pations  have  been  realized — Texas  annexed,  and  peace  preserved,  by  the  policy 
which  I  pursued.  A  diflerent  line  of  policy — one  which  would  have  permitted 
England  to  obtain  the  ascendency  over  Texas,  which  she  would  have  acquired 
without  annexation,  would  have  inevitably  led  to  a  state  of  things,  involving  us 
and  England  finally  in  war.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to  prevent  feelings  of 
Jvftloasjr  and  enmitj  from  growing  up  between  us  and  Texas.    The  very  similari- 


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i 


ty  of  our  character  and  pursuits,  and  the  rivalry  which  they  would  give  birth  to» 
would  necessarily  lead  to  that  result;  while  the  long  and  ill-defined  boundary be> 
tween  the  two  countries,  extending  for  more  than  a  thousand  miles  through 
forests,  prairies,  and  navigable  rivers,  without  a  natural  boundary  in  any  part, 
would  produce  frequent  collisions  between  our  people  and  these  of  Texas.  Contro. 
versies  and  conflicts  would  have  been  the  result.  Texas,  ns  the  weaker  power, 
would  throw  hcrsetf  upon  Great  Britain  for  support ;  and  wars,  ir(>(|uent  and  bloody 
wars,  between  us  and  her  would  have  followed.  Annexation  has  fortunately  re> 
moved  these  causes  of  war.  Should  the  Oregon  controversy  terminate  in  peace, 
every  cause  of  war  between  the  two  countries  would  be  removed,  leaving  the  pros> 
pect  of  lasting  peace  between  them.  n 


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five  birth  to^ 
oundary  be. 
liles  through 
in  any  part, 
tas.  Contro. 
Baker  power, 
nt  and  bloody 
•rtunately  re. 
ate  in  peace, 
ing  the  proa. 


